








Most	 (but	 not	 all)	 adult	 persons	with	 anorexia	 satisfy	 the	 existing	 criteria	widely	
used	to	assess	decision-making	capacity,	meaning	that	incapacity	typically	cannot	be	
used	 to	 justify	 coercive	 intervention.	 After	 rejecting	 two	 other	 approaches	 to	
justification,	Professor	Radden	concludes	that	it	is	most	likely	not	possible	to	justify	
coercive	medical	intervention	for	persons	with	anorexia	in	liberal	terms,	though	she	
leaves	 it	open	whether	some	other	 framework	might	 succeed.	 I	 shall	 assume	here	
that	the	standard	approach	to	assessing	decision-making	capacity	is	adequate.1		The	




course,	 much	 turns	 on	 what	 ‘liberal’	 means.	 I	 take	 ‘liberal’	 to	 describe	 a	





















	 Though	a	 limited	 justification	 is	possible,	 I	wish	 to	emphasize	 that	coercive	
intervention	with	the	choices	of	persons	with	anorexia	is	only	rarely	justified.	This	is	
extremely	 important,	 because	 I	 do	 not	 wish	 to	 provide	 arguments	 for	 those	
whomight	misuse	 coercive	 power.	 Coercive	 intervention	 is	 only	 rarely	 justified	 in	
anorexia	because	 it	 is	only	rarely	plausible	 to	 think	that	 it	would	be	 in	 the	overall	
best	 interests	 of	 such	 patients.	 Liberalism	 can	 sometimes	 justify	 paternalistic	
intervention,	but	only	if	genuine	benefits	are	likely.		
	 Persons	with	anorexia	jeopardize	their	lives	by	restricting	food	intake	to	the	
point	 where	 their	 starved	 bodies	 are	 prone	 to	 various	 types	 of	 malfunction.	 If,	
having	reached	such	a	point,	they	continue	to	restrict	they	will	die.	And	it	is	worth	
remembering	 that	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 patients	 do,	 in	 fact,	 die	 of	 this	 illness.4	
Coercive	 intervention	 in	 the	 form	 of	 forced	 weight	 gain	 therefore	 looks	 most	
appealing	 to	 third	 parties	 (family	members,	 therapists,	 judges)	 when	 a	 patient	 is	
dangerously	underweight	and	death	is	an	imminent	possibility.				
	 However,	 mere	 continued	 biological	 life	 is	 not	 necessarily	 in	 the	 best	
interests	of	persons	with	anorexia.5	Coercive	intervention	is	justified	therefore	only	
if	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 the	 patient	 could,	 if	 restored	 to	 a	 safer	 weight,	 overcome	
anorexia	and	go	on	 to	 live	a	 life	 free	of	 the	distresses	and	misery	characteristic	of	
chronic	 anorexia.	 Given	 the	 complexities	 of	 prediction,	 the	 requirement	 is	 best	
stated	 negatively:	one	should	not	coercively	 intervene	 if	one	has	reason	to	 think	 full	
recovery	unlikely.	 Research	 reveals	 that	 the	 longer	 a	 person	has	 anorexia,	 the	 less	
likely	she	is	to	fully	recover	(Von	Holle	et.	al.	2008;	Treasure	et.	al.	2011;	Treasure	et	


















assumptions	often	neglected	 in	 the	bioethics	 literature.7		First,	 I	assume	welfare	 is	
real,	meaning	there	are	objective	facts	(whether	or	not	we	know	them)	about	which	
choices	are	better	or	worse	for	people.	There	are	better	and	worse	ways	for	a	life	to	
go.	 Second,	 such	 a	 claim	 is	 entirely	 compatible	 with	 a	 sophisticated	 form	 of	
subjectivism	 about	 welfare,	 according	 to	 which	 something	 cannot	 be	 good	 for	
someone	at	a	time	unless	at	that	time	she	either	(a)	enjoys	it,	or	(b)	sees	value	in	it.8	
This	 view	 holds,	 however,	 that	 when	 a	 person	 wants	 something	 but	 doesn’t	 yet	
“have”	 it,	we	 cannot	 know	 for	 certain	whether	 it	would	 be	 good	 for	 her	 to	 get	 it.	
Whether	it	would	or	not	depends	on	what	her	own	response	to	it	would	be	once	it	is	
“in”	her	life.			
	 This	brings	me	 to	 the	 third	point,	which	 is	 that	 this	 form	of	 subjectivism	 is	
compatible	with	recognizing	that	people	can	(and	frequently	do)	make	choices	that	
fail	 to	 serve	 their	 own	 interests	 subjectively	 construed.	 Individuals	 can	 be	 wrong	
about	 their	 own	 welfare,	 but	 then,	 so	 can	 third	 parties.	 Let	 us	 say	 a	 prudential	
mistake	 occurs	 whenever	 a	 person	 chooses	 something	 that	 will	 leave	 her	 with	 a	
level	of	welfare	far	less	than	what	she	would	have	had,	had	she	chosen	differently.	
One	 common	 aim	 of	 personal	 decision-making	 is	 to	 avoid	 prudential	 mistakes.	
However,	in	different	situations	there	may	be	more	or	less	evidence	to	support	the	
















of	 paternalism.	Only	 once	we	 treat	welfare	 as	 real	 and	 grasp	 that	 subjects	 can	be	
wrong	 about	 their	 own	welfare,	 do	we	 recognize	 that	 the	 following	 kind	 of	 case,	
though	 rare,	 is	possible.	 	This	 is	 a	 case	where	a	 subject	 S	wishes	 to	 choose	X,	 but	
where	 there	 is	 good	 evidence	 for	 thinking	 the	 choice	 of	 X	would	 be	 a	 prudential	
mistake	(subjectively	construed)	for	S.	Moreover,	 in	this	case,	 the	consequences	of	
mistake	 are	 both	 dire	 and	 irreversible,	 and	 there	 is	 also	 good	 reason	 to	 think		
coercive	intervention	could	bring	about	a	better	result.	Yet	for	whatever	reason,	S	is	





is	 that	we,	 as	 rational	 agents,	must	 always	 avoid	 paternalism	 because	 in	 treating	




irrationality	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 would-be	 paternalist.	 I	 confess,	 I	 do	 not	 find	 this	
persuasive,	 precisely	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 focus	 on	 what	 matters	 to	 individuals.	 If	
paternalism	 is	 wrong	 it	must	 be	 because	 of	 how	 it	 affects	 those	who	 are	 treated	
paternalistically.			
	 A	 second	 liberal	 approach	 identifies	 two	 values	 important	 for	 individuals:	
free	choice	and	welfare.	There	 is	great	value	 for	 individuals	 in	being	 free	 to	make	
their	 own	 significant	 life	 choices.	 Moreover,	 free	 choice	 is	 usually	 conducive	 to	
welfare.	 However,	 precisely	 because	 prudential	mistakes	 are	 possible,	 free	 choice	
can	sometimes	conflict	with	the	value	of	welfare,	i.e.	the	value	of	living	a	life	that	one	
finds	 value	 in.	 Some	 theorists	 insist	 that	 of	 these	 two	 values	 free	 choice	 is	 more	
important,	 with	 the	 result	 that	 conflict	 should	 always	 be	 resolved	 in	 its	 favor	
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This	 is	 hardest	 to	 accept	 where	 a	 person	 is	 (though	 he	 doesn’t	 see	 it	 this	 way)	
plausibly	 viewed	 as	 throwing	 away	many	 years	 of	 life	 that	would	 likely	 be	 years	




	 A	 third	 kind	 of	 argument	 against	 intervention	 has	 its	 origins	 in	Mill	 (1962	
[1859]).	It	begins	with	the	same	two	potentially	conflicting	values	but	grants	more	

















However,	 future	 gratitude	 among	 many	 people	 who	 have	 undergone	 X	 is	 good	








death	 is	a	prudential	mistake.	 It	 is	moreover,	 a	mistake	 that	 coercive	 intervention	
may	 in	 certain	 limited	 cases	 rectify,	 therefore	 salvaging	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 welfare	
(subjectively	 construed)	 at	 relatively	minor	 costs	 to	 overall	 lifetime	 freedom.	We	
also	 have	 a	 good	 explanation	 for	 why	 the	 subject	 is	 ignoring	 the	 evidence.	 For	
persons	with	anorexia	are	characterized	 in	part	by	a	narrow	mental	 focus	on	food	
and	 weight.	 We	 can	 make	 use	 of	 this	 knowledge,	 even	 while	 allowing	 that	 their	
thought	processes	are	good	enough	that	 they	have	decision-making	capacity.	Here	
what	we	know	about	how	persons	with	anorexia	think	and	the	existence	of	strong	
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